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	S DISTRICT COURT TRICT OF NEW YORK	
	X	
SECURITIES AND COMMISSION,	ND EXCHANGE	
	Plaintiff,	
V	·	19 CV 9439 (PKC)
		19 CV 9439 (INC)
TELEGRAM GRO	UP, INC., et al.,	
	Defendants.	
	x	New York, N.Y.
		October 18, 2019 10:30 a.m.
Before:		
	HON. P. KE	VIN CASTEL,
		District Judge
	APPEA	RANCES
	ND EXCHANGE COMMISS	ION
Attorne	ys for Plaintiff cGRATH	
JORGE TI DAPHNA I		
SKADDEN. ARP	S, SLATE, MEAGHER &	FLOM
Attorne	ys for Defendants ER DRYLEWSKI	
SCOTT M	USOFF	
CHRISIO	PHER MALLOY	

(Case called)

THE COURT: Good morning, good to see you all.

First question for the plaintiff is since my order of late yesterday, have any agreements been reached?

MR. TENREIRO: Good morning again, your Honor, thank you. Yes, we have been in conversations with counsel for the defendants since your order of yesterday.

We believe we have an agreement at least with respect to a schedule for conducting a hearing in this case and perhaps a trial. We also believe that we have an agreement that we will continue to engage in as expedited discovery as possible, and I think we have an agreement there should be what I think in the Court's order was called a standstill, but there seems to be some disagreement from the defendants between us as to whether the defendants need to continue to be enjoined until the resolution of this case.

And their hesitance to want to be enjoined while we resolve this matter completely gives us some concern, because on the one hand they're telling us that they don't plan to do something, but on other hand they're telling us that they don't want to be under a court injunction. So I think that is the biggest remaining issue of disagreement amongst the parties.

THE COURT: All right. Talk to me about the proposed schedule and the like.

MR. TENREIRO: Yes, your Honor. So there is a slight

disagreement between the parties as to whether this case can be fully resolved as a legal matter or not, and we certainly don't -- it's a little bit difficult for us to tell whether there will be factual disputes as to what occurred in the past or not. But assuming that we can get to some sort of list of stipulation of facts, we would propose what we have been calling amongst ourselves sort of a joint PI/summary judgment hearing.

THE COURT: Well, I call it something different than that, because in non-jury cases summary judgment is an extremely inefficient tool. You're going to have to put your direct testimony in by affidavit for the preliminary injunction hearing. You will have to do that for the trial as well. And that's not a summary judgment procedure at all, that's a trial.

MR. TENREIRO: Your Honor, that's correct, and we want to have a jury trial, so we requested a jury trial.

THE COURT: Of what issue?

MR. TENREIRO: The issue of whether these are securities or not might require a resolution of fact as to what they told people they could expect from these investments.

THE COURT: And that's, in your view, not an issue of law, that's an issue of fact?

MR. TENREIRO: It depends on whether there's a dispute as to the facts. If they dispute that they told people you can expect this or that from this purchase, then yes, a jury has to

resolve that factual dispute. If we get to a point where there's no dispute as to those facts, then yes, it's a purely legal question.

THE COURT: Let me find out from the defendants, first off, if this is a case that should be tried to a jury.

MR. DRYLEWSKI: Good morning, your Honor. Alex Drylewski for the defendants.

Our position is no. The case law in this area is clear, Judge Castel, that the issue of whether an instrument is a security under the Howey Test, which is the test that both parties agree applies here, is a legal one. And in fact, we have some case law saying that in the context of a civil suit -- I'm quoting from a case called SEC v. Thompson (10th Cir. 2013), "In the context of a civil suit, the ultimate question of whether an instrument is a security is a question of law and not of fact, such that submitting the question to a jury was error."

So what we proposed to the SEC is let's have one hearing, we can call it a preliminary injunction and summary judgment hearing, where if your Honor would like to hear evidence or receive affidavits of testimony, we can provide that, but the parties will also brief in advance whether or not this legal question can be resolved in one side's favor or whether it's the other side's favor.

Now we asked for a bench trial. The SEC has said that

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it will not consent to a bench trial, it wants a jury trial. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 3 Is that correct, the SEC will not consent to a bench 4 trial in this case? 5 MR. TENREIRO: That is correct, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Okay. So how do you respond to the cited 7 case that suggests that it is error to submit the question of whether an instrument is a security to a jury? 8 9 MR. TENREIRO: Your Honor, I would cite to SEC v. 10 Jensen from the Ninth Circuit, the citation is 835 F.3d 1100, where the Ninth Circuit said that it was reversible error for 11 12 the district court to not permit the SEC to have a jury trial 13 because the SEC had brought claims for disgorgement and civil 14 penalties, as we have here. 15 THE COURT: Let's take a look at that. I take it, by 16 citing that case you concede there is no Supreme Court or 17 Second Circuit precedent on the issue. 18 MR. TENREIRO: Not that I'm aware of, your Honor. THE COURT: So 835 F.3d 1100. 19 20 Maybe I'm misreading this, but this stands for the 21 proposition that there are claims in which the SEC is entitled 22 to a jury trial, right? 23 MR. TENREIRO: Correct.

That's not the question we're discussing.

THE COURT: I think that's right. I agree with that.

MR. TENREIRO: Your Honor, the point that --1 THE COURT: So that case, do you agree, it does not 2 3 address whether the SEC is entitled to a jury trial on the 4 question of whether an instrument is a security, correct? 5 MR. TENREIRO: Your Honor, I think the case stands for 6 the proposition that the district court should be careful in 7 not depriving a civil litigant the right to jury trial if they have made the demand for a jury trial. We agree, I think 8 9 perhaps --10 THE COURT: Why don't you answer the question that I 11 asked. MR. TENREIRO: We agree that if there --12 13 THE COURT: No, why don't you answer the question that 14 I asked. MR. TENREIRO: That case does not stand for the 15 proposition that a Howey question has to be, or not, submitted 16 17 to a jury. 18 THE COURT: Okay. I thought you were citing it to me 19 for that proposition. 20 MR. TENREIRO: I apologize, your Honor. I was trying 21 to explain that our position is that if there are no actual 22 factual disputes, then absolutely the Court can and should 23 decide the question of Howey as a matter of law. 24 At this stage in the litigation, though, we don't know 25 that that will be the case, because the Court's application of

law always turns on what the underlying facts are, and if the defendants say certain things to the market and to potential investors, that colors the Court's analysis of what a reasonable investor should or should not have expected from the purchase of Grams.

THE COURT: I hope you will promise me that if I grant you a preliminary injunction you won't turn around and change course and say now I don't want a jury.

MR. TENREIRO: It really, your Honor, depends on whether there's disputes of facts, that's all.

THE COURT: No, but you're taking this position now and for all time, you don't want a jury in this case, correct?

MR. TENREIRO: Well, we're taking the position that we would like a jury.

THE COURT: You want a jury in this case in all respects, you're not going to back off that position two months from now, is that correct?

MR. TENREIRO: That's correct, only on factual disputes.

THE COURT: That's what I wanted to know. That's what I wanted to know. Thank you.

So tell me the schedule that you're proposing.

MR. TENREIRO: So we were proposing January 20 for a hearing before the Court in which any purely legal questions as which there are no factual disputes may be resolved.

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that, correct?

1 THE COURT: Say that again? MR. TENREIRO: A hearing before the Court at which any 2 3 purely legal questions as to which there are no factual 4 disputes may be resolved. 5 THE COURT: I got a question for you: Why would I 6 need a hearing for that? 7 MR. TENREIRO: I'm sorry? THE COURT: Why would I need a hearing for that? 8 9 MR. TENREIRO: We think we need a preliminary 10 injunction hearing because we have made a showing that there is likelihood of success on the merits. The defendants would like 11 to submit the question to the Court, and we are agreeing to 12 13 that proposal based on their request. 14 THE COURT: So what would I hear at such a hearing? 15 MR. TENREIRO: I think, your Honor, respectfully, I believe that's a question for the defendants. We want to 16 17 present at that hearing our showing of likelihood of success on the merits and an entitlement to a preliminary injunction. 18 19 THE COURT: But I thought you just told me something 20 else, that would be a hearing at which you would present 21 whatever it was that could be decided as an issue of law. 22 paraphrasing, but that's what I understood you to be saying. 23 MR. TENREIRO: That's correct, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: So there's no evidence to be taken on

MR. TENREIRO: We would present evidence that entitles such a preliminary injunction. The defendants seek to present evidence to the Court at a hearing and have the Court, based on that evidence, issue a ruling on the entire merits of the case. We believe that that's called a motion for summary judgment, and --

THE COURT: Well, but what you're advocating, and I understood you and the defendants were agreeing that on this January 20th proposal -- and I should mention that that's not available, in fact I have a jury trial that week, but that's a small problem, I will take care of finding an appropriate date.

But what I'm not getting is why you would call it a hearing if it's for the Court to decide only a legal issue and none other.

MR. TENREIRO: Your Honor, if I may take a step back. If the defendants are enjoined, as we requested and as we believe we're entitled to, they're enjoined from violating Section 5 for the remainder of the litigation, then we can have — I wouldn't call it a hearing, I would call it a summary judgment or oral argument, and the Court would not take evidence, it would only look at undisputed facts, and that's what we would call it.

THE COURT: And that's what you're proposing for January 20.

MR. TENREIRO: Not quite, because the defendants are

not agreeing to be enjoined for the rest of the litigation, so that's the problem, but if we --

THE COURT: But that's not part of the agreement then. Just confine yourself to what is part of the agreement.

MR. TENREIRO: The agreement would be that at that date we get to present our case for a preliminary injunction and they get to argue that they're entitled to summary judgment. That's the agreement we have reached.

THE COURT: And you're not going to move for summary judgment?

MR. TENREIRO: We haven't decided. We might simultaneously move for summary judgment. It's too soon for us to know.

THE COURT: And what would be the course of expedited discovery?

MR. TENREIRO: The course of expedited discovery would be along the lines of what we have in the order to show cause, which we would attempt in good faith to -- we have already been talking about meeting and conferring on some of these issues, we would have some depositions and document discovery over the course of the next couple of months, and we would submit to the Court the undisputed facts for resolution of legal issues.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from the defendants.

MR. DRYLEWSKI: Thank, your Honor, Alex Drylewski for

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the defendants again.

We think that this hearing should be akin to a summary judgment argument. We are confident at this point, and we suspect strongly there will be no issues of fact. And this is again a legal issue that the case law is clear, the Howey Test is a legal question that this Court can decide without taking any evidence.

So we have been talking about putting together a schedule where we will seek and give expedited discovery in aid of that hearing and in advance of that hearing that we hope to do by mid January, if your Honor's schedule permits.

In terms of the discovery deadlines themselves, what I hear counsel for the SEC saying is it would like the same emergency deadlines to remain in effect in this case, which were under your Honor's order that was entered last Friday, I believe three days for document productions and four days for deposition witness production. We would like to go back and meet and confer. This is the first we're hearing that this is what they would like the discovery schedule to look like. We would rather meet and confer and come up with reasonable timelines for that.

THE COURT: Okay. Now talk to me about the standstill. I think I understand the bid and the asked on this, and let me hear from the SEC on this. Your understanding is that the defendant is looking for paragraph one of its

proposed order, which reads "Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction is hereby denied without prejudice."

That's what you're objecting to, is that correct?

MR. TENREIRO: Your Honor, thank you, that is correct. We're also objecting to the standstill only lasting for five months and then us having to come back.

THE COURT: Understood. Thank you. It seems to me that the way to do this, there are a number of moving parts, they're not novel or unusual moving parts, they're the everyday thing of what goes on in this courthouse. But what I see is an order that lays out the expedited discovery, a schedule, a reasonable schedule with reasonable deadlines for production of documents and depositions and for briefing, and then it can recite in that same order that upon the agreement of the parties, defendant shall not offer, sell, or deliver Grams to any person or entity pending the hearing of the preliminary injunction motion. Now on the day of the hearing, somebody can stand up and ask for a continuation of that, somebody can ask for a dissolution of that, but it seems to me you don't need paragraph one at all, you don't need that.

Now the other items, three and four and seven, some reservation of rights for both sides, and seven sounds always a fine thing to do, it doesn't hurt, you probably reserve those rights whether you put the language in or not. So that sounds good.

And let me see whether I can get you a date that would work. I have a criminal trial starting the week of January 20 and a criminal trial starting the week of February 3rd, so I would propose to have the briefing, the injunction hearing, everything on February 17 at -- we'll begin on the 17th, we'll begin at 11:00 a.m., and I'll set aside the 17th and the 18th, if parties think that is going to be enough for the hearing on the preliminary injunction. And the parties may, of course, move or cross move for summary judgment.

The requirement would be that all the final last brief of any sort by anyone on anything, that includes reply, surreply, sur, sur surreply or any other denominated filing would be in hand by January 27 so that the Court can adequately prepare for the hearing.

MR. DRYLEWSKI: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DRYLEWSKI: Just one point, February 17 is Presidents' Day. We're fine on that day, but if the Court isn't open --

THE COURT: No, all right, thank you. We'll make it the 18th and 19th. Again we'll start at 11:00 on the 18th, we'll start at 10:00 on the 19th.

And what I'll do is I will keep the date we have on now, which is the 24th, and I anticipate vacating that as soon as I get a stipulation which lays out the schedule and includes

what I call a standstill.

All right? Does that work for everybody?

MR. TENREIRO: Yes, your Honor. May I seek clarification on one point?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. TENREIRO: On the language of the standstill, I think I understood the Court in terms of timing. What we would request — and we can take this back to defendants, we already requested it — language that says or "otherwise violates Section 5," because I don't know that distributing Grams is the only way that they can violate Section 5.

THE COURT: Here's the problem you have, and it has been very much on my mind: You look at Rule 65(d) and the Second Circuit's case law in this area, and a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction should describe the act or acts restrained, and the Court has specifically condemned an injunction which requires the subsequent determination of whether a law has been violated.

Now I understand in consent injunctions that's done every day, but those are consent injunctions, and the Second Circuit noted specifically that point. So that's my problem with Section 5.

Now I will tell you this, that you have the ability -you need to reserve for your client the ability to come in on a
moment's notice if facts change. I am not foreclosing that

possibility, and if something develops, I am sure you will be here quite quickly.

MR. TENREIRO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. What else?

MR. DRYLEWSKI: Nothing from the defendants, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. TENREIRO: Nothing from us, your Honor.

THE COURT: So I'm not anticipating seeing you on the 24th, but I'm holding that possibility open, and for the -- I should say for the preliminary injunction hearing, it will be done by direct testimony by affidavits. So you have to work out a schedule on that for all witnesses under a party's control.

MR. TENREIRO: Thank you, your Honor. Are we permitted to put in any live testimony of a witness if the witnesses are here and willing to show up and testify, or do everything by affidavit?

THE COURT: If it's a witness who you can control, they're coming voluntarily, then that should be direct testimony by affidavit.

MR. TENREIRO: By affidavit.

THE COURT: If it's an adverse witness, then it can't be, obviously. And you will find some guidance in my individual practices on this. They spell out how this should

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be done. And the party with the burden of proof would go
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      first, then the defendants, and, of course, you have the right
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      to put in a rebuttal declaration as you would in any hearing.
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               MR. TENREIRO: Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I think that's probably it.
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               Anything else from the defendants?
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               MR. DRYLEWSKI: Nothing, your Honor, thank you.
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               THE COURT: Thanks for coming in on very short notice,
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      I appreciate it. And I think this is shaping up to be a
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      sensible way to proceed. Thank you.
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               MR. TENREIRO: Thank you, your Honor.
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               MR. DRYLEWSKI: Thank you.
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               (Adjourned)
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